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THE TREBLE DAMAGE PROVISIONJURY INSTRUCTIONS IN PERSPECTIVE
ALFRED L. PARKER*

Section 4 of the Clayton Act reads as follows:
Any person who shall be injured in his business or property by
reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor
in any district court of the United States in the district in which the
defendant resides or is found or has an agent, without respect to the
amount in controversy, and shall recover threefold the damages by
him sustained, and the cost of suit, including a reasonable attorney's

fee.'
A continuing question in jury trials of private antitrust cases is
whether the jury should be informed of the trebling provision of the
statute.
To date, no reversible error has been found in a trial court's instructions that any awarded damages will be trebled or that reasonable attorney's fees may also be recovered; nor for the trial court's
refusal to provide such instructions.
The often cited authority for informing the jury that damages will
be trebled by the court is the ruling of the Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit in Bordonaro Bros. Theatres, Inc. v. ParamountPictures, Inc.' Authority for the position that trebling should not be
mentioned is provided by Sablosky v. ParamountFilm Distributing
Corporation3 and Webster Motor Car Co. v. PackardMotor Co.4 The
Sablosky decision was not appealed and the Court of Appeals opinion, reversing the Webster case on other grounds, does not reveal any
consideration of the treble damage instruction. Thus neither case
provides a Court of Appeals ruling on the issue. To overcome this
weakness plaintiffs' attorneys frequently cite the opinion of the
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Richfield Oil Corp. v.
*Associate Professor of Economics, University of New Mexico.
1. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1964).
2. 203 F.2d 676 (2d Cir. 1953). For a listing of additional cases providing authority for
informing the jury that damages will be trebled by the court, see Viking Theatre Corp. v.
Paramount Film Distributing Corp., 320 F.2d 285, aff'd 378 U.S. 123 (1960).
3. 137 F. Supp. 929, 941-2 (E.D. Pa. 1955).
4. 135 F. Supp. 4, 11 (D.D.C. 1955).
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Karseal Corp. - In the Richfield opinion Judge Carter noted that
"The instructions on damages, unchallenged, were fair and accurate
and presented fully the applicable law on damages in this type of
action." 6 The instructions there did not contain any mention of
trebling.
As the issue now stands in the courts, the contradictions could not
be more complete. There are reasonable, rational arguments presented by authorities on both sides of this issue. Timberlake argues
that "the overwhelming weight of authority and, it is believed, the
better view holds that the jury should be advised of the fact of
trebling." 7 Timberlake identifies three basic reasons authorities have
developed in support of view that the jury should be advised of the
fact of trebling.' First, it is argued that the jury is entitled to know
the terms and provisions of the statute under which the action is
brought. 9 Second, the jury may learn of trebling from other sources,
e.g., the newspapers, and unless the trebling provision is clearly explained to the jury, basic misunderstanding may arise which would
result in totally erroneous verdicts and judgments. And third, it is
argued that the fact that damages will be trebled is a matter to be
considered in weighing the credibility of the parties and witnesses.' 0
On the other side of the issue, Mitchell has characterized plaintiffs'
attitude toward mentioning trebling as analogous to defense counsels' attitude toward mentioning liability insurance in negligence
cases.' This argument was expressed by Judge Holtzoff in Webster
Motor Car Co. v. Packard Motor Car Co.:" 2
There was no reason for informing the jury that whatever damages
they would award would be trebled, because this is a matter solely
for the court. In fact, the jury might have taken such a statement as
an intimation to keep the damages at a low level, in view of the fact
that the amount allowed by the jury would be multiplied by three.
This would have tended to defeat the purpose of the Act of Congress. 13
5. 271 F.2d 709 (9th Cir. 1959).
6. Id. at 715.
7. E. Timberlake, Federal Treble Damage Antitrust Actions 280 (1965).
8. Id. at 280-82.
United
9. The following cases are cited as approving reference to the terms of the statute;
Electrical, Radio & Machine Workers v. Oliver Corp., 205 F.2d 376, 387 (8th Cir. 1953);
Terminal Railroad Ass'n of St. Louis v. Howell, 165 F.2d 135, 139-40 (8th Cir. 1948).
10. Timberlake, supra note 7, at 282.
of the
11. M. Mitchell, Private FederalAntitrust Action, California Continuing Education

Bar 92 (1970).

1955).
12. Webster Motor Car Co. v. Packard Motor Car Co., 135 F. Supp. 4, 11 (D.D.C.

13. Id.at 11.
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THE IMPACT OF ALTERNATIVE INSTRUCTIONS
Clearly if the issue is to be resolved the impact of the alternatives
involved must be carefully examined. More specifically we must identify and carefully examine those errors that may result if the trebling
provision is not explained and those errors that may result if the
trebling provision is explained to the jury.
Timberlake identified two possible errors which may result if the
trebling provision of the statute is not explained to the jury:
... the jury might itself treble the amount of damages with the
effect that plaintiff would recover nine times the amount of actual
damages. Or the jury might divide the amount of damages by
three.14
For purposes of this discussion it is, I believe, appropriate to generalize the two errors identified by Timberlake as follows: 1.) A
Type I error occurs when the jury awards damages in excess of that
amount supported by the evidence (e.g., the jury's damage figure is
as a result of misunderstanding and/or misinformation trebled by the
jury only to be trebled again by the court); 2.) A Type II error
occurs when the jury awards damages less than the amount supported by the evidence (e.g., the jury divides their damage estimate
by three).
Of course the jury award will be influenced by a variety of factors
including the nature of the violation, the expert testimony, the background of the jury, the ability, conduct and personality of defendant
and plaintiff attorneys and more. The errors as defined above are an
attempt to isolate the impact on the award (other things equal) of
the jury's knowledge of the trebling provision. The Type I and Type
II errors so defined recognize that knowledge of the trebling provision (whether obtained from jury instructions or other sources) may
have an independent influence of its own on the damage award.
An examination of court approved instructions relating to the
treble damage provision suggests that such instructions should minimize if not eliminate the possibility of a Type I error. The two
examples presented below should help to clarify this point. In the
often cited case of Cape Cod Food Products v. National Cranberry
Association,1 ' jury instructions included the following statement:
With respect to damages, you may be somewhat misled by something that you see in the complaint, and just to avoid any misleading
I am going to make explicit one point. You are only to calculate

damages, if any, or loss of profits, if any, upon the basis of single,
14. Timberlake, supra note 7, at 282.
15. 119 F. Supp. 900 (D. Mass. 1954).
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and not treble, damages. It is true that under the antitrust act, if the
plaintiff prevails, the judgment which he would ultimately get would
be three times the amount of his damages and loss of profits. But the
trebling of the amount1 6is no part of the jury's function. That is a
question for the court.

More recently, in Farmington Dowel Products Co. v. Forster

Manufacturing Co., 1 7 jury instructions included this statement:
If you should find that the plaintiff is entitled to recover in this
action, the amount of damages, if any, is to be determined by you
upon the basis of single and not treble damages. Your verdict, in
other words, will be only for such amount as you find from evidence
is reasonably necessary to compensate the plaintiff for any injury to
his business or property by reason of any violations of the antitrust
laws committed by the defendants. You as the jury will not treble
that amount. You will not treble that amount nor will you as the
jury include any amount for costs of suit or for a reasonable attorney's fee as the trebling of damages and the awarding of costs of suit
and a reasonable attorney's fee is my function as the Judge in the
event you should return a plaintiffs verdict. 1

It appears most unlikely that a jury upon receiving such instruc-

tions would make the error of trebling its award. These same instructions may, however, increase the possibility of Type II errors.
The knowledge that the jury's award will be trebled by the court
provides the jury with a rationale for awarding damages less than that
amount supported by the evidence.
The diagram below provides a useful summary of the probable
impact of jury instructions relating to treble damages. In the construction of this diagram we assume there are some juries that know
something about the trebling provision and some that do not know
about the trebling provision. When the jury instruction contains an
explanation of the trebling provision (INSTR.) the possibility of a
Type I error is decreased and the possibility of a Type II error is
increased as indicated. When the jury instruction contains no reference to the trebling provision (no instr.) the potential for Type I and
Type II errors varies depending on the jury's knowledge or ignorance
of the trebling provision. As indicated below, if the jury has knowledge (though imperfect knowledge) of the treble damage clause the
possibility of both Type I and Type II errors may be highly significant. If the jury has no knowledge of the treble damage clause the
possibility of both Type I and Type II errors is eliminated.
16. Id. at 911.
17. 297 F. Supp. 924 (D. Me. 1969), modified 421 F.2d 61 (1st Cir. 1970).
18. 297 F. Supp. at 926.
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From this summary it appears that the jury with no knowledge of
the treble damage clause and no instruction relating to this provision
is the better alternative. It is probably unreasonable, however, to
assume that the jury in a private treble damage action will not learn
of the trebling provision during the trial. Realistically, therefore, the
court must decide whether or not to explain the trebling provision to
a jury that is probably already aware of its existence, but may have
some misunderstanding about it. The choice as summarized in the
diagram above is between leaving the possibility open for both Type
I and Type II errors or decreasing the possibility of Type I errors
while perhaps increasing the possibility of Type II errors. The fact
that plaintiffs in private treble damage actions consistently prefer the
first alternative while defendants consistently prefer the second
should not be surprising.
A CHANGE OF PERSPECTIVE
If the jury has knowledge of the trebling provision (whether this
knowledge came from jury instructions or other sources) the effect
of this knowledge is to significantly alter the perspective from which
the jury must determine damages. With knowledge of the trebling
provision, the emphasis of the jury's deliberations, once the fact of
damage has been established, is shifted from a determination of the
actual amount of damages sustained by the plaintiff, to a determination of the total amount to be awarded, i.e., three times the jury's
award. This change of perspective has the effect of substantially
altering the role of the jury in the private treble damage action.
Issues to be determined by the jury in a private treble damage suit
include the following:
(1) Has the defendant violated the antitrust laws of the United
States?
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(2) Has the defendant's violation of the antitrust laws been a proximate cause of any injury to the plaintiffs?
(3) What dollar amount of damages is supported by the evidence?
With knowledge of the trebling provision the jury may also consider
the following questions in their deliberations:
(4) How much should the defendant be punished for his antitrust

violation(s)?
(5) Should the plaintiff receive an award in excess of the damages
sustained and if so how much?
It is obvious that the jury's considerations of these last two issues
is not consistent with Congressional intent. The fact that the trebling
provision was not left to the discretion of the trial judge or the jury
suggests that Congress intended to limit jury deliberations to the fact
of damage and the actual amount of damages resulting from the
violation. With knowledge of the trebling provision it appears unlikely, however, that the jury can avoid these issues. It also seems a
very natural jury reaction to the trebling provision to multiply suggested dollar estimates of damages by three, thus evaluating the total
award to be made by the jury.
Recognizing the probability that juries with knowledge of the
trebling provision will consider issues (4) and (5) listed above in their
deliberations, it seems unwise to permit a jury to enter such deliberations without any or with inadequate instruction relating to the purpose of the trebling provision.
If the jury in a private treble damage action is to maintain a
perspective consistent with the purposes of antitrust law, without
prejudicing the interests of either defendant or plaintiff, the jury
instruction relating to the treble damage clause must include a discussion of the purpose of the trebling provision in particular and
punitive damages in general.
For example, it would be constructive for the jury to be made
aware that in authorizing private treble damage actions ".

.

. Congress

intended to provide not only for private redress but also to impose
sanctions to secure the more effective enforcement of antitrust legislation." 1 9 Thus the private treble damage action was intended by
Congress to permit those injured by violations to recover damages, to
deter other violations, 2" and "to supply an ancillary force of private
19. Trebuhs Realty Co. v. News Syndicate Co., 107 F. Supp. 595, 599 (S.D. N.Y. 1955).
20. Fanchon & Marco v. Paramount Pictures, 100 F. Supp. 84, 88 (S.D. Cal. 1951), aff'd
215 F.2d 167 (9th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 912 (1955); Maltz v. Sax, 134 F.2d 2,
4 (7th Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 319 U.S. 772 (1942); Weinberg v. Sinclair Refining Co., 48
F. Supp. 203, 205 (E.D. N.Y. 1942); Quemos Theatre Co. v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 35
F. Supp. 949 (N.J. 1940).
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investigators2 to supplement the Department of Justice in law enforcement., 1
PUNITIVE DAMAGES
The instruction relating to the "purpose of damage recovery, provided by Clayton Act" cited by the American Bar Association publication Antitrust Civil Jury Instructions2 2 reads as follows:
The purpose of awarding damages in a private antitrust case is to put
the plaintiff in as good a position as if the conspiracy had not
occurred. 2 3
Such an instruction may be adequate and appropriate in instructing a
jury unaware of the trebling provision. For a jury aware of the trebling provision the instruction is both incomplete and misleading. It
ignores the concept of "punitive" damages and provides a somewhat
distorted view of the single damage award. The instruction appears to
imply that the single damage award fully compensates plaintiff for
injury and thus two-thirds of the treble damage award is a "windfall"
for the plaintiff. In fact the division of the treble damage award into
"compensatory" and "punitive" damages may vary greatly from
the
one-third/two-thirds division implied by the treble damage provision. 4 To clarify this point, a more detailed instruction relating to
the interest or adjustment for inflation issues would be constructive.
In a suit where treble damages are available, the courts have concluded that interest or an adjustment for inflation is not allowed.2 I
Although jury instructions relating to damages have frequently stated
this position, further clarification is needed to place the punitive
aspects of the treble damage award in proper perspective.
The jury should be made aware that a portion of the treble damage award compensates the plaintiff for the fact that the plaintiff was
denied the use of these funds (the profits lost, the overcharge paid,
etc.) for the period of time between the injury and the awarding of
damages. If the time interval between the date at which damages
were sustained and the date at which damages are awarded is substantial this will greatly increase the share of the trebled damages to be
21. Weinberg v. Sinclair Ref. Co., 48 F. Supp. 203, 205 (E.D.N.Y. 1942).
22. ABA Antitrust Section, Antitrust Civil Jury Instructions (1972).
23. Id. at 207, citing Hawaiian Oke & liquors v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, 272 F.
Supp. 915 (1967), rev'd, 416 F.2d 71 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1062 (1969).
24. See A. Parker, Treble Damage Action-A FinancialDeterrentto Antitrust Violations,
16 Antitrust Bulletin 488, 492 (1971).
25. 15 Am. Jur. Damages § 169. See also Locklin v. Switzer Bros., 72705 Trade Cas.
(N.D. Ill. 1969); Woods Exploration and Producing Co. v. Aluminum Co. of America, 284
F. Supp. 582 (S.D. Tex. 1968), 304 F. Supp. 845 (S.D. Tex. 1969), rev'd, 438 F.2d 1286
(5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 104 (1972); Gorham & Johnson v. Chrysler Corp.,
308 F.2d 462 (5th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 912 (1963).
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properly defined as compensatory damages, while at the same time
measurably reducing the share to be labeled punitive damages.
For example, assume that the plaintiff (e.g., a state highway
department) was overcharged $25,000 in 1963 as a result of an antitrust violation and that the jury awards single damages of $25,000 in
1973. If plaintiff could have earned a 6 percent return on the money
paid in the overcharge, plaintiff must receive the amount of the
overcharge plus the interest that would have accrued in order to be
fully compensated for the injury. Thus compensatory damages would
include single damages plus interest. In this example a 6 percent
return on $25,000 for the ten year interval between the injury and
the awarding of damages would amount to interest of $19,771. Compensatory damages would therefore be equal to $44,771 (=$25,000 +
$19,771) or 59.7 percent of the treble damage award. Accordingly,
would equal $30,229 or 40.3 perin this example, punitive damages
2
cent of the treble damage award. 6
The point which the jury should be made aware of is that punitive
damages generally amount to significantly less than two-thirds of the
treble damage award. This is particularly the case where there is a
long time lag between the injury and the awarding of damages.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
of this paper to examine the question of
purpose
the
been
It has
antitrust actions should be informed of
private
in
jury
whether the
of the Clayton Act. The conclusions to
provision
damage
treble
the
analysis may be summarized as follows:
preceding
the
from
drawn
be
First, the jury instructions relating to damages should include reference to and clarification of the treble damage clause. Second, the
jury instructions relating to damages should include a clear and complete explanation of the purpose of the trebling provision in particular and punitive damages in general. Third, to insure that the jury's
perspective of punitive damages is not distorted, the jury should be
made aware of the "compensatory" interest element in the trebled
damage award. More specifically, the jury should be made aware that
because the time interval between injury and awarding of damages is
normally substantial in private treble damage actions, a large portion
of the treble damage award provides compensation for the loss of use
of the single damages awarded by the jury, i.e., compensation for the
interest lost during the interval between injury and the awarding of
damages. Finally, to insure that the jury understands the limits of its
26. For a more complete discussion of the division of treble damages between compensatory and punitive damages, see Parker, supra note 24, at 488-505.
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fact-finding role, a simple, summary statement relating to its function should be included as a part of the jury instructions. This statement might read as follows:
If you find that the plaintiff is entitled to recover in this action, the
amount of damages, if any, is to be determined by you from the
evidence presented. Your verdict will be only for such amount (profits lost, overcharge paid, or other) as you find supported by the
evidence. In the determination of the actual amount of damages you
are not to take into account the trebling provision, the awarding of
attorney's fees, interest, or punitive damages. It is your function to
determine, on the basis of the evidence presented, the actual damages sustained and award that amount to the plaintiff(s).
Only when the jury is provided complete detailed instructions
relating to the trebling provision, including instructions as to the
purposes of the provision and instructions clarifying the interest
issue, is it in a position to deal with the question of damages within a
framework consistent with the minimization of both Type I and
Type II errors and thus consistent with the purposes of antitrust law.
law.

